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Animals in the Original Position 
to extend the coverage of whatever principles they adopt so 
as to cover more than the class of moral persons~e.g. the 
children they might be born as. 
7 VanDeVeer, p. 375. 
8This orientation helps justify Rawls's demand for a thin 
theory of the good, and a special emphasis on the primary 
goods which enable a person to pursue her chosen life plans. 
Elliot correctly notes that controversy rages about whether 
Rawls is successful in avoiding "want-regarding principles"; 
however, he does not think that animals pose any 
insunnountable difficulties in this regard (Elliot, pp. 103-104). 
9 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 243-248. 
10 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and Killing Animals," 
Ethics, vol. 22 (1979), pp. 145-156. 
11 It would seem that Regan's analysis of a "subject of a 
life" is also meant to capture a sense of individuality, but one 
which requires substantially less intellectual capacity than 
Rawls's account of a moral person. 
12 Rawls, pp. 505-510, passim. 
13 Elliot, p. 104. 
14Cf. Rawls, p. 142. 
15Again, this is predicated on serious doubts about Regan's 
analysis of a "subject-of-a-life". Cf. fn. 10. 
16 VanDeVeer and Regan both discuss this point, although 
it does not seem to be the major focus in either case. 
17 This comparison tacitly recognizes an additional 
complicating factor that is not discussed in this paper: the 
fact that being a moral person may well be a matter of degree. 
I do not think this simplification affects the analysis of the 
arguments under analysis here, since none of them mentions 
this dimension, but it is dangerous to ignore it entirely. 
18 For more on this topic, see Michael Wreen, "In Defense 
of Speciesism," Ethics and Animals, vol 3 (1982), pp. 47-60, 
and James Lindemann Nelson, "Animals, Handicapped 
Children, and the Tragedy ofHandicapped Cases," Journal 
ofMedical Ethics, vol 14 (1988), pp. 191-193. 
Commenta,ry: 
On the Utility of Contracts 
Steve F. Sapontzis 
California State University, Hayward 
In many discussions that touch on animal rights, the 
participants clearly feel they know the truth and proceed 
to shape arguments to fit that truth. We owe Professor 
Russow our thanks for a careful, thoughtful discussion 
which has no axe to grind. 
If I understand her argument, it runs something 
like this. 
A. To understand whether participants in the original 
position could be incarnated as nonhuman animals, 
we need to understand what the original position 
is supposed to accomplish. 
B. The original position was set up in response to 
Rawls's dissatisfactions with utilitarianism, 
principally to overcome (what he believes to be) 
utilitarianism's failure to respect individuality. 
C. Individuality, in the morally significant sense, 
involves having and caring about a life-plan. 
D. Consequently, the participants in the original 
position can be assured of being incarnated only 
as beings capable of having and caring about life-
plans, so-called "moral persons," because only such 
beings are the object of the original position exercise. 
E. Very few, if any, nonhuman animals are capable of 
having and caring about life-plans. 
F. Consequently, the participants in the original 
position can be assured that with, at most, very few 
exceptions, they will be incarnated as human beings. 
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Thus, given the cOlmniunent to protecting individ-
uality (as defined in C), a consistent theory of justice 
which excludes most all nonhuman animals (and a few 
marginal humans) follows. 
The pivotal steps in Professor Russow's analysis are 
the commitment to respecting individuality and the 
definition of individuality in tenns ofhaving a life-plan. 
Both of these steps are, according to Professor Russow, 
the result of Rawls's dissatisfaction with utilitarianism. 
She tells us that "If one rejects utilitarianism in favor 
of respect for individuality, one moves inevitably, as 
Rawls does, toward a system which protects the 
individual's ability to choose and carry out her own 
plans, to further her own purposes." 
That statement is obviously true, but trivially so, 
since its being obviously true derives ft;om its employing 
a definition of "individuality" which refers to having 
life-plans. Ifone rejects utilitarianism in favor ofrespect 
for those with life-plans, one will inevitably end up with 
a system that protects those with life-plans. There cannot 
be significant question about such a truism. The 
significant issue is not what a rejection ofutilitarianism 
in favor of respecting moral persons would inevitably 
lead to but whether Rawls's criticisms of utilitarianism 
would inevitably lead to defining individuality in terms 
of life-plans and calling for the respecting of such 
individuality. I do not find that that is where those 
criticisms inevitably lead. 
In section 5 of the first chapter of A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls's criticism of utilitarianism focuses on 
the lack of a principle of distribution in utilitarian 
conceptions of justice: "The striking feature of the 
utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter, 
except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is 
distributed."(TOJ, 26) "This sum of satisfactions" refers 
to "the greatest sum of satisfaction of the rational desires 
of individuals."(TOJ, 25) Lack of a principle of 
distribution permits the sacrifice of individuals in order 
to maximize the general welfare and indicates a degree 
of indifference to individuals. All this is very well-trod 
ground and has, as Professor Russow notes, nothing in 
particular to do with animal ethics issues. 
It also has nothing in particular to do with respecting 
beings having "a rational plan of life," Le., moral 
persons. Although Rawls, like classical utilitarians, 
clearly is only concerned with normal human beings-
as evidenced by his reference to "rational desires"-
lack of assurance for individuals that they will receive 
an equitable share of available goods and lack of 
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protection for individuals against being sacrificed for 
the general welfare are concerns of justice no matter 
what kinds of vulnerable beings are involved. The 
hackneyed example of how a candy bar should be 
divided among children-wheitller each should get an 
equal share and equal pleasure or one should get all the 
candy and all the pleasure-indicates that "having a 
rational plan of life" is irrelevantto this criticism of 
utilitarianism. There is a question of justice here and a 
failure on the part of utilitarianism, if it cannot account 
for the injustice of the inequi table distribution, but none 
of this hinges on respecting rational life-plans, since 
(with very few exceptions) eating candy has nothing to 
do with life-plans. 
If utilitarianism is indifferent to inequitable 
distributions, the offense to our intuitive sense ofjustice 
concerns some innocent individuals suffering or being 
deprived while others enjoy most of the goods and 
pleasures available and perhaps even prosper from the 
others' loss. Appreciating the injustice of such 
arrangements in no way leads one to emphasize the 
ability to choose, carry out plans, or further purposes, 
because lack of concern for the distribution of goods 
need not involve frustrating choices, plans, or projects. 
Even those who cannot choose, plan, and project, such 
as young children and nonhuman animals, can receive 
the short end of the stick when it comes to distributing 
pleasures and pains. What a desire to overcome the 
distributive shortcomings of utilitarianism inevitably 
leads to, then, is not a procedure that respects just those 
who have life-plans; rather, it leads to principles which 
protect all those who might be sacrificed for the general 
welfare against such sacrifice and which assure all 
concerned that they will receive an equitable share of 
available goods. 
Such principles can be fonnulated without reference 
to moral persons, except insofar as moral persons are 
the sorts ofbeings to whom such principles are directed 
in order to inhibit their tendencies to injustice. For 
example, in Moral Philosophy, D. D. Raphael contends 
that the principle of utility, "Do that which will lead to 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number," already 
contains a principle of distribution. The imperative to 
seek happiness for the greatest number can be 
interpreted as directing us to distribute happiness as 
widely as possible. Alternatively, one could add to the 
imperative to maximize utility Ilbe qualification that the 
maximum that is compatible with equitable distribution 
is to be chosen. Other, more complex alternatives 
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referring expliciUy to Rawls's insights concerning when 
inequalities of distribution are equitable, could also be 
formulated without referring to moral persons as the 
exclusive beneficiaries of these qualifications (or 
clarifications) of the principle of utility. The concern of 
these principles of distribution would not be "Can they 
choose?," "Can they plan?," or "Can they project?" 
Their concern about the individuals to be protected 
would still be "Can they suffer?" 
Consequently, if the limitation of the concern of the 
original position participants to the fate ofmoral persons 
originates with Rawls' dissatisfactions with utilitar~ 
ianism, that is not because those dissatisfactions depend 
in any essential way on what distinguishes moral 
persons from other vulnerable beings. Rather, it derives 
from the incidental fact that participants in Ulis debate 
over the adequacy of utilitarianism have, by and large, 
been concerned only with moral persons. Remarks 
about obligations to other beings have generally been 
relegated to footnotes, parentheses, and afterwords, 
especially in the period during whichA Theory ofJustice 
was being written, which predates Animal Liberation 
by several years. 
RawIs's own, brief discussion ofpossible obligations 
to nonhuman animals occurs late inA Theory ofJustice, 
beginning on page 504. On page 505, in response to 
the question of "what sorts of beings are owed Ule 
guarantees ofjustice," Rawls responds Umt "The natural 
answer seems to be that it is precisely Ule moral persons 
who are entitled to equal justice. [E]qualjustice is owed 
to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act 
in accordance with the public understanding of the initial 
situation." Rawls goes on to indicate that moral person-
hood should be treated as a sufticientbut not a necessary 
condition for the guarantees ofjustice-presumably out 
of concern about "marginal" humans-but it is clear 
that in this contractarian approach to justice, those who 
are entitled to the protection of principles of justice are 
those who can and have agreed to abide by the contract 
containing those principles: "Those who can give justice 
are owedjustice."(TOJ, 510) That contractarian attitude, 
I submit, rather than criticisms of utilitarianism, is Ule 
basis for the elimination of nonhuman animals from 
the guarantees of Rawlsian justice. 
It follows that in addition to the sorts of criticism of 
that elimination discussed by Professor Russow.. 
questions about that contractarian attitude are also to 
the point. We can, for example, question whether the 
question of "what sorts of beings are owed the 
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guarantees ofjustice" is not itselfprejudicial. Questions 
about who is owed something ordinarily presuppose that 
Ule benefit has to be earned or, at least, that it does not 
follow from one's being able to benefit from something 
that one should have it. However, matters of moral or 
social justice and associated basic rights differ from 
special rights and privileges in being guarantees that 
one does not have to earn. So, should not the question 
here be "Under what conditions can a being who could 
benefit from just treatment be denied the guarantees of 
justice?" Putting the question that way eliminates the 
suggestion that one must earn the guarantees of justice 
by doing something special, such as subscribing to a 
contract. As William James says: 
Take any demand, however slight, which any 
creature, however weak, may make. Ought it 
not, for its own sake, to be satisfied? If not, 
prove why not. (Essays in Pragmatism, p. 73) 
Again, contracts ordinarily presuppose Umt all the 
parties to it both have something to contribute to the 
others and will benefit from entering into the contract. 
On the other hand, many instances of moral and social 
concern with justice involve situations in which one 
party is at the mercy of the other. Here the principles of 
justice are supposed to prevent the powerless from being 
exploited with impunity by the powerful. In such 
situations, the presumption of reciprocation that 
underlies contracts-you are owed something because 
you have given something-is out of place. The 
powerless pose no Uueat to the powerful, and the 
powerful would be better off exploiting the powerless. 
Nonetheless, the exploitation of the weak by the strong 
is unjust, is even a paradigm of injustice. 
Does it not follow that contractarian constructions 
of justice must inevitably fall short of providing a 
complete theory of justice and that this shortfall 
concerns not only marginal cases but a fundamental 
moral and social concern with justice? Referring to 
questions about "how we are to conduct ourselves 
toward animals and the environment," Rawls 
acknowledges Ulat "Ule contract notion" may not offer 
"a way to approach" all "moral relationships,' (TOJ, 17) 
but the shortcomings of the contractarian approach may 
be much more important to an adequate tlleory ofjustice 
Ulan has been acknowledged. 
Finally, there are many examples of individuals who 
are not parties to a contract being intended beneficiaries 
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of that contract. For example, many parents sign 
contracts with day care centers to watch over and tend 
to their children. So, is it so ''natural'' to believe that, 
with only marginal exceptions, only those who 
subscribe to a contract containing principles of justice 
are to beuefitfrom the guarantees of justice? Even 
though nonhuman animals cannot be parties to a 
contract, it does not follow that they could not be 
intended beneficiaries of that contract. Consequently, 
if the participants in the original position can be 
incarnated as any of the intended beneficiaries of the 
contract they devise-a contract designed to overcome 
the distributive shortcomings of utilitarianism-they 
could be incarnated as nonhuman animals. 
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Replly: 
Rawls: Rejecting 
Utilitarianism Bind Animals 
Lilly-Marlene Russow 
As is his custom, Professor Saponztis begins his 
reply with a masterful reconstruction of my basic 
argument, the better to pinpoint the exact nature of our 
disagreement. His reconstrucltion is entirely accurate 
and fulfills its function admirably. It allows us to focus 
directly on the key issue: the proper interpretation of 
and justification for Premise C: "Individuality, in the 
morally significant sense, involves [for Rawls] having 
and caring about a life-plan." 
In my paper, I argued that this premise could be 
justified by Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism and that 
it, in turn, justified excluding most nonhuman animals 
from the original position. Sapontziscontends, in 
contrast, that Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism is too 
weak to support Premise C. He thinks that Rawls rejects 
utilitarianism primarily because it lacks a fait principle 
ofdistribution and argues that a demand for justice and 
fair distribution does not yield any conclusions about 
the relevance or importance of life-plans. He concludes 
that Rawls's exclusion of animals springs from his 
contractarian bent rather than from his rejection of 
utilitarianism. If this is correct, Rawls's position is much 
less interesting and plausible:: mariy arguments (most 
notably, "marginal case" sorts of arguments) discredit 
generally contractarian approaches from the outset, 
while critiques of utilitarianism are more likely to 
demand serious and sustained attention. 
Sapontzis is correct in claiming that Rawls is 
concerned about utilitarianism's apparent willing-
ness to countenance unjust distributions; however, I 
think Rawls's objections go beyond that. Another, 
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